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Abstract
The politics of the United Nations aims at sustainable development (i.e., development that can
continue with future generations). Andreas Losch has recently proposed to expand our current
notion of sustainability to what he calls ‘planetary sustainability’, and he has urged an ethics of
planetary sustainability. This comment article discusses these proposals. The proposed concep-
tual change is assessed, drawing on desiderata suggested by Carnap. To the extent to which the
current notion of sustainability has excluded consideration of outer space, we gain in simplicity.
To the extent to which it has been unclear about this issue, we gain in exactness. The proposed
concept is fruitful because it points to important considerations, in particular if there are extra-
terrestrial beings that share moral status with human beings. But to some extent this fruitfulness
requires a clear deviation from the anthropocentric outlook of our current notion of sustainabil-
ity, and costs regarding similarity arise. As far as an ethics of sustainability is concerned, we
certainly need to address ethical issues that arise in relation to outer space. However, the notion
of planetary sustainability is not likely to figure prominently in related thoughts because the
notion of sustainability is not a key concept in known ethical theories.
Social media summary
The idea of planetary sustainability points to important moral concerns, but it is not very use-
ful for a moral theory.
Humans increasingly explore and use outer space. In this context, many ethical questions arise,
for instance: are we free to use the resources from outer space? And how should we protect the
interests of possible living beings that inhabit other planets?
To address these questions, Andreas Losch (2019a) has recently called for a new ethics.
Borrowing a term that has been used before by NASA (2014), Losch calls it an ‘ethics of
planetary sustainability’. Here, ‘planetary’ is supposed to underscore that the Earth is a planet
embedded in outer space.
Do we need this notion and an ethics of planetary sustainability? In what follows, I will
critically assess the concept of planetary sustainability and the idea of a related ethics. I assume
that the term ‘planetary sustainability’ is supposed to designate a concept that is different from
the well-known notion of sustainability, even if it only extends the latter in some way (cf.
Beisbart, 2019, for an extended version of my argument).
1. The concept of planetary sustainability
The concept or notion of planetary sustainability combines the idea of sustainability with a
broader perspective, which is called ‘planetary’. Sustainability is supposed to provide a condi-
tion on a development that is already assumed to be progressive. According to the definition
proposed by the Brundtland Commission, a development is sustainable if it ‘meets the needs of
the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’
(United Nations World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987). As is plain
from this definition, sustainable development requires a long-term perspective. This accords
with the meaning that ‘sustainable’ has in everyday language, viz. ‘[a]ble to be maintained
at a certain rate or level’ (Oxford Dictionaries, n.d.). In transnational politics, the idea of sus-
tainable development has been a success story. In 2015, the UN General Assembly set 17
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs; United Nations, 2015). Losch’s proposal of an ethics
of planetary sustainability is in this context; Losch has called for an 18th SDG, titled ‘Our
Space Environment’ (Losch, 2019a).
Although the most prominent definitions of sustainable development do not explicitly refer
to humanity, it is clear from the context that they only cover human development. Other living
beings are only taken into account to the degree to which they are important for human devel-
opment. In this sense, the idea of global sustainability is anthropocentric. This may be part of
the reason why the concept has been so successful.
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Our planet figures prominently in the rhetoric of sustainabil-
ity. For instance, the UN resolution that has set the SDGs calls
itself ‘[…] a plan of action for people, planet and prosperity’
(United Nations, 2015, preamble). It is thus plausible to say
that outer space is neglected under the current notion of sustain-
ability, although this would not follow from the definition strictly
speaking. Alternatively, it may be said that the role of outer space
in our thinking about sustainability is unclear.
It consequently seems appropriate to broaden, or to clarify, the
notion of sustainability and to introduce a new concept – call it
‘planetary sustainability’ – that replaces the old notion of sustain-
ability. The new concept is supposed to take outer space into
account. In particular, the effects that our activities have on
outer space and the effects that outer space can have on develop-
ment should be considered (Losch, 2019a).
How good is this proposal to transform the notion of sustainabil-
ity? To assess the proposed conceptual change, we can draw on desid-
erata that Carnap (1950/1962) proposed for the introduction of new
concepts, viz. exactness, simplicity, similarity and fruitfulness.
If the previous concept of sustainability was not clear about
whether outer space should be considered, then the proposed
notion of planetary sustainability promises gains in exactness.
By contrast, if the previous concept of sustainability has clearly
excluded consideration of outer space, then its replacement by the
notion of planetary sustainability yields benefits in simplicity. The
reason for this is that the definition of the previous concept of
sustainability is more complicated because it needs a restriction
to Earth – a restriction that can be dropped in a definition of
planetary sustainability.
Hence, depending on whether the previous notion of sustain-
ability was clear about outer space (or not), the proposed concept
of planetary sustainability is simpler (or more exact) than the pre-
vious one. Still, the potential gains do not seem very significant.
The other two desiderata listed by Carnap are more interesting
in our case.
Carnap assumes that the more similar a replacement of a con-
cept is to its predecessor, then the better it is. In our case, similar-
ity is a concern as follows: since the previous notion of
sustainability is well entrenched and has been successful at the
level of politics, it is desirable that the new concept be as similar
as possible to the previous one.
The similarity between planetary sustainability and sustainabil-
ity, as regarded previously, depends on how exactly the former is
understood. The most crucial question in this respect is how we
should deal with possible extra-terrestrial beings that share key
characteristics with human beings (e.g., the ability to act rationally).
This is a substantial moral question with two possible answers: (1)
they deserve moral status (i.e., they count as sources of underivative
value or as subjects of moral rights); or (2) they do not have moral
status. The first answer seems clearly more defensible on moral
grounds, although it is still a matter of discussion as to what pre-
cisely the features are that give a being moral status. The question
then is whether we free the previous notion of sustainability from
its anthropocentric outlook (which would also mean that it
becomes simpler) or stick with the former anthropocentric
assumptions. If we choose the former option, then the new concept
will be very dissimilar to the previous one; by contrast, it will be
very similar to the previous one if we stick with anthropocentrism.i
To be sure, it is unlikely that we will soon have to deal with
extra-terrestrial beings who can act rationally, etc. (Losch,
2019b). But even the epistemic possibility of such beings (i.e.,
the fact that our knowledge does not exclude their existence) or
the potential of extra-terrestrial beings to become rational matters
for ethics. The reason for this is that risks and potentials are in
general morally relevant.
Turning now to fruitfulness: for Carnap, a concept is more
fruitful than another if it allows for more generalizations. The
notion of planetary sustainability is undoubtedly fruitful because
it broadens our perspective and points to considerations that mat-
ter from a moral point of view. For example, it forces us to regard
space debris as a profound problem because an ever-increasing
amount of such debris does not allow future generations the
use of outer space. This argument assumes that outer space and
the materials that are found there are just like any other resources
and that they deserve the same treatment as do other resources.
Since this assumption is plausible, we can conclude that the
notion of planetary sustainability is fruitful in the sense that it
allows for generalizations about all sorts of resources.
There is a second dimension in which generalization may be
discussed, viz. regarding possible extra-terrestrial beings. As indi-
cated above, it is plausible to assume that our moral status gener-
alizes to them if they share relevant characteristics with us. If this
is correct, then we can generalize about all (kinds of) beings that
share certain characteristics. The notion of planetary sustainabil-
ity is likely to support this way of generalizing and thus to be
fruitful if it is not conceived in an anthropocentric manner
anymore.
Consequently, fruitfulness and similarity pull to some extent in
opposite directions when we deliberate on what precisely planet-
ary sustainability is supposed to be: we keep closer to our previous
notion of sustainability if we stick with the anthropocentric out-
look implied by a significant amount of reasoning about sustain-
ability, while our notion will be more fruitful if we give up the
anthropocentric outlook. This dilemma casts doubt on the
claim that replacing the previous notion of sustainability with
that of planetary sustainability is recommendable.
2. An ethics of planetary sustainability
What about an ethics of planetary sustainability? Undoubtedly, we
need to think about moral questions that arise concerning outer
space. We can address these questions in ‘space ethics’ (for this
term, see Williamson, 2003). We only need an ethics of planetary
sustainability if this sustainability is pivotal in space ethics.
There are two reasons to doubt that this condition will be met:
first, the notion of sustainability does not figure prominently in
well-known moral theories and our moral thinking. While
terms such as ‘rights’, ‘well-being’ and ‘justice’ are key in theoriz-
ing within normative ethics, ‘sustainability’ is not. For instance,
Darwall’s (1998) introduction to ethics does not use the term
(for a critical view on the notion, see Beckerman, 1994). This
does not imply that concerns of sustainability are alien to moral
theories. The preservation of humanity is a serious concern for
them (e.g., Jonas, 1979/1984). The supply of future generations
with resources is discussed under the label ‘intergenerational just-
ice’ (see, e.g., Meyer, 2016). As far as outer space (or planetary
sustainability) is concerned, prominent moral theories have the
resources to take it into account, without any explicit appeal to
planetary sustainability. For example, utilitarianism takes into
account everything that has a causal bearing on human well-
iThe argument can be generalized to a gradable notion of moral status. Note also that
the moral status of extra-terrestrial beings is compatible with the idea that we may some-
times give priority to our fellow humans.
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being; likewise, many utilitarians are willing to expand the circle
(to use the title from Singer, 1981) if they find that some kinds
of beings deserve moral status as we do. One likely reason as to
why the notion of sustainability does not arise in many ethical
theories is that talk of sustainable development puts the cart
before the horse: sustainability is conceptualized as potential
characteristic of progressive development, but indeed the
concern that humankind is preserved is more fundamental
(Jonas, 1979/1984).
Second, an ethics that puts global sustainability at the centre
cannot deal with certain questions that arise in relation to outer
space. Consider, for instance, the following questions: how valu-
able is knowledge about other planets? Should some planets be
preserved in their current state for purely aesthetic reasons?
Such questions are not naturally discussed using the notion of
planetary sustainability. The reason for this is that development
may be progressive and sustainable independently of whether
we preserve planets in their current state for aesthetic reasons.
3. Conclusions
Clearly, outer space should be taken into account in our moral
deliberation, but it is unlikely that the notion of (planetary) sus-
tainability will become a key term in normative ethics. As far as
the notion of sustainability is concerned, there are some reasons
to replace it with the concept of planetary sustainability: to the
extent to which the previous notion was unclear about outer
space, a clarification is an advantage. To the extent to which
the previous notion has excluded considerations that pertain to
outer space, the proposed concept is simpler than the previous
one. In either case, the proposed notion is fruitful because it
points to important considerations and because it supports gen-
eralizations about all kinds of beings with moral status. However,
to some extent, the benefits of fruitfulness arise only if we free
the previous notion of sustainability from its anthropocentric
presuppositions. This would lead to a significant departure
from our previous thinking about sustainability and may thus
become problematic for continuing the success story of the
concept of ‘sustainability’.
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